“This paper studies the publishing game played by researchers and editors when the editors adopt an impartial selection process. It analyzes the possibility of congestion in the editorial process and shows that, depending on the nature of the equilibrium, the rise of the rejection costs could be an inappropriate solution to avoid the congestion effect.”
Damien Besancenot (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII);
João Faria (IPED - Institute for Policy and Economic Development - University of Texas-El Paso);
Kim Huynh (L.E.M. - Laboratoire d'Economie Moderne - Université Paris 2).
Date: 2009-05-07
Keywords: Publication market, Academic journals, Editors, Congestion
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00382585_v1&r=edu
(resumo de “working paper”, disponível no sítio referenciado)
Damien Besancenot (CEPN - Centre d'économie de l'Université de Paris Nord - CNRS : UMR7115 - Université Paris-Nord - Paris XIII);
João Faria (IPED - Institute for Policy and Economic Development - University of Texas-El Paso);
Kim Huynh (L.E.M. - Laboratoire d'Economie Moderne - Université Paris 2).
Date: 2009-05-07
Keywords: Publication market, Academic journals, Editors, Congestion
URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00382585_v1&r=edu
(resumo de “working paper”, disponível no sítio referenciado)
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